In this paper we shall meet the application of Scott domains to nominalisation and explain its problem of predication. We claim that it is not possible to nd a solution to such a problem within semantic domains without logic. Frege structures are more conclusive than a solution to domain equations and can be used as models for nominalisation. Hence we develop a type theory based on Frege structures and use it as a theory of nominalisation.
Frege structures, a formal introduction
Having in part I informally introduced Frege structures, I shall here ll in all the technical details and show that Frege structures exist. Consider F 0 , F 1 ; : : : ; a family F of collections where F 0 is a collection of objects, and (8n > 0) F n is a collection of n-ary functions from F n 0 to F 0 ]. De nition 1.1 (An explicitly closed family) A family F as above is explicitly closed i :
For every expression e x 1 ; : : : ; x n ] of the metalanguage built up in the usual way from variables ranging over F 0 and constants ranging over n F n , the n-place function denoted by < e x 1 ; : : : ; x n ]=x 1 ; : : : ; x n > is in F n . More formally, F is explicitly closed i 1, 2 and 3 below hold:
1. Closure under constant functions: For each a in F 0 , the function f a is in F 1 , where (8x) f a (x) = a].
2. Closure under composition: For each f in F m , for each g 1 ; : : : ; g m in F k , f(g 1 ; : : : ; g m ) is in F k where (f(g 1 ; : : : ; g m ))(x 1 ; : : : ; x k ) = f(g 1 (x 1 ; : : : ; x k ); : : : ; g m (x 1 ; : : : ; x k )). 3 . Closure under projection: For each n; i 1; P n i is in F n where P n i (a 1 ; : : : ; a n ) = a i for each a i in F 0 and, 1 i n.
For example, if f and g are unary functions of F and h is a binary function of F, then < f g(h(x 1 ; x 2 ))=x 1 ; x 2 > is a 2-ary function (i.e. in F 2 ).
In what follows, we assume such a closed family and call it F. De nition 1.2 (F-functional) A function D : F n 1 : : : F n k ?! F 0 is an F-functional with respect to the explicitly closed family F, i : (8m 0)(8f 1 in F m+n 1 ) : : : (8f k in F m+n k ) < D(< f 1 ( y; x 1 )= x 1 >; : : : ; < f k ( y; x k )= x k >)= y > is in F m ] where y is a list of m-variables and x i is a list of n i variables, for i = 1; : : : ; k.
Note that if f 1 ; ::; f k are 1-place functions and D : F 1 : : : F 1 ?! F 0 then D(f 1 ; : : : ; f k ) is in F 0 . What is the intuitive meaning of F-functionals? We know that an F-functional is a functional, so that it operates on functions. But once we include functionals in the structure, we need to ensure that any expression which contains functionals should actually be in the structure. Assume for the sake of argument that D : F n 1 : : : F n k ?! F 0 is an F-functional. Assume also that for some m 0; f i is in F m+n i for i = 1; : : : ; k. We know that according to the explicit closure, if y is a list of m-variables ranging over F 0 and for each i; x i is a list of n i variables ranging over F 0 , then < f i ( y; x i )= x i > is an element of F n i for each i. Therefore it makes sense to talk of the expression D(< f 1 ( y; x 1 )= x 1 >; : : : ; < f k ( y; x k )= x k >). This expression however is open in y and if we abstract over y in this expression are we going to obtain an element of F m ? Nothing so far in the structure ensures that this is the case, and we must therefore impose the constraint that these functionals should have such a property. A functional which has this property is called an F-functional and now if D is an F-functional then < D(< f 1 ( y; x 1 )= x 1 >; : : : ; < f k ( y; x k )= x k >)= y > is in F m ]. Hence we extend the de nition of explicit closure to the following: De nition 1.3 (A super explicitly closed family) Taking a family as above, we say that this family is super explicitly closed i for every expression e 1 ; : : : ; m ] of the metalanguage, built up in the usual way from variables ranging over n F n and constants ranging over n F n and over F-functionals, the m-place function denoted by < e 1 ; : : : ; m ]=xi 1 ; : : : m > is an F-functional. This notion of explicit closure is going to provide us with the full comprehension principle we have been promising. Theorem 1.4 Any explicitly closed family which has variables for functions and objects, constants for objects, functions and F-functionals, is a super explicitly closed family. (The proof is by an easy induction.) Example 1.5 As an example of an explicitly closed family, consider P ! as described previously. De ne F 0 to be the set of all subsets of ! (i.e. P ! ). De ne, for each n 0; F n to be the set of all continuous functions from F n 0 ?! F 0 . Using Part I, it can be easily seen that the constant functions, the projection functions, etc are continuous. It can also be seen that continuity is closed under composition and that any combination e x 1 ; : : : ; x n ] of variables for objects and constants for both functions and objects results in the function denoted by < e x 1 ; : : : ; x n ]=x 1 ; : : : ; x n > being an element of F n . Therefore the family (F n ) n just obtained from P ! (call it FE), is an explicitly closed family. Furthermore, FE is super explicitly closed as it can be proven not only that < e x 1 ; : : : ; x n ]=x 1 ; : : : ; x n > denotes a continuous function but also that for any expression e 1 ; : : : ; n ] built in the usual way out of variables ranging over n F n and constants ranging over both n F n and F-functionals, < e 1 ; : : : ; n ]= 1 ; : : : ; n > denotes a continuous function.
So far, we have only explicit closure on our structure. But that is not enough to give a logic on the structure. In what follows, we see how to obtain such a logic.
Assume an explicitly closed family F and a list of logical constants which are the following F-functionals:
: : F 0 ?! F 0 _;^; !; _ = : F 0 F 0 ?! F 0 8; 9 : F 1 ?! F 0 De nition 1.6 (Logical system) A logical system on a super explicitly closed family F, relative to a set of logical constants as above, is < PROP; TRUTH > the set of two collections of objects such that TRUTH PROP. These two collections are closed under an adopted logical schemata for each logical constant. The logical schemata corresponds to the external logic and tells us, for each logical constant from the list, how to build new propositions out of other ones using the logical constant. It also gives the conditions of truth for the resulting proposition.
THE LOGICAL SCHEMATA
NEGATION If a is in PROP then :a is in PROP and :a is in TRUTH i a is not in TRUTH. CONJUNCTION BI-IMPLICATION If a; b are in PROP then (a b) is in PROP and (a b) is in TRUTH i (a is in TRUTH i b is in TRUTH). From now on, we shall use a is true for a is in TRUTH, a is a proposition for a is in PROP and a is a set for a is in SET. In short, a logical system builds a logic on our structure. But something is still missing: even, though we built the logical system on the top of an explicitly closed structure, where functional abstraction < e x 1 ; : : : ; x n ]=x 1 ; : : : ; x n > and application f(x) do exist, we still need a way of turning functions into objects (via ) and of applying such objects to other objects (via app) so that app( f; x) = f(x). We do not want to gain logic yet lose the bijection between objects and functions. Therefore, our structure must have more in it. The next de nition will tell us what.
De nition 1.7 ( -system) A -system on an explicitly closed family F is a pair of functionals < ; app > such that: : F 1 ?! F 0 and app : F 0 F 0 ?! F 0 satisfy: app( xf x]; a) = f(a), for each f in F 1 and a in F 0 . Example 1.8 If we take the system FE of Example 1.5, and if we de ne : F 1 ?! F 0 as f = f(n; m) : m is in f(e n )g where we take (n; m) to be 1=2(n + m)(n + m + 1) + m and de ne app : F 0 F 0 ?! F 0 as app(a; b) = fm : e n b for some n; (n; m) is in ag; then ( ; app) forms a -system for FE.
Proof: app( f; a) = fm : e n a for some n and (n; m) is in fg = fm : e n a for some n and m is in f(e n )g = fm in f(e n ) : e n ag = f(a) by continuity. Therefore ( ; app) is a -system for FE. Actually, FE contains and app and so it is a -structure, but we leave this to the next de nition.
De nition 1.9 ( -structure) A -structure is an explicitly closed family F which has asystem.
Note that the -structure contains and app and that it is an explicitly closed family. Example 1.10 Now take the -system FE given in Example 1.8. FE is also a -structure having ( ; app) as -system, because both and app are in FE, as FE is explicitly closed. De nition 1.11 (Frege structures) A Frege structure is a logical system relative to a list of logical constants on an explicitly closed family F, together with a -system. Example 1.12 As an example of a Frege structure, take the -structure FE given in Example 1.10 and which has a -system ( ; app). Aczel (in Aczel 1985] ) showed that each -structure can be extended to a Frege structure. Therefore we now have an example of a Frege structure. 2 Note the two equal signs, _ = and =. The rst is a functional from F0 F0 to F0 such that a _ =b is always a proposition and a _ =b is true i we can prove from the rules of -calculus with logic that we are formulating that a = b. For example, we know from above that app( f; x) = f(x), hence the proposition app( f; x) _ =f(x) is true.
Let us sketch the proof of how our particular -structure FE can be extended to a Frege structure. This will make the reader understand the notion of Frege structure, and get him used to working with it. Before proceeding, however, we must de ne two missing notions: that of an independent family of F-functionals and of a primitive F-functional. De nition 1.13 We say that a family of F-functionals is independent i for any two Ffunctionals in the family, the range of values of those F-functionals are disjoint. This implies that if F and G belong to an independent family of F-functionals, then for any f and g such that F( f) = G( g), we should de nitely have F = G. From independence only we cannot conclude that f = g. For this we need primitivity and this is the next notion we de ne.
De nition 1.14 We say that an F-functional F : F n 1 : : : F n k ?! F 0 is primitive i there exists a projection P i in F n i +1 for each 1 i k such that P i (F ( f);â) = f i (â) where f = f 1 ; : : : ; f k is in F n 1 : : : F n k andâ is in F i 0 . The aim of primitive F-functionals is similar to injectivity; if we have F( f) = F( g) then we should be able to deduce f = g. It can be easily checked from the de nition of F-primitiveness that this is the case.
The proof that we can extend any -structure into a Frege structure is based on two theorems. The rst is one which asserts the existence of an independent family of primitive F-functionals on the -structure, which include the logical constants,^; _ etc. It simply states that: Theorem 1.15 If for each natural number m we let (v m 1 ; : : : ; v m k ) be a nite sequence of natural numbers, then there is an independent family of primitive F-functionals: F m : F vm 1 : : : F vm k ?! F 0 , for m = 0; 1; 2; : : :.
The second is the well known xed point theorem which applies to monotonic operators and helps us to nd the logical schema of these logical constants. This theorem simply states the following: Theorem 1.16 If A is a partially ordered collection of objects such that every chain in A has a least upper bound then any monotonic operator Y from A to A has a xed point. That
Let us apply those two theorems to our FE and obtain out of it a Frege structure. Up to here, we know that the -structure FE exists and Theorem 1.15 enables us to nd all the logical constants needed. What remains to turn it into a Frege structure is to nd a logical system for the logical constants. This is the task of Theorem 1.16. The idea is to associate with each logical constant two predicates which will ultimately (after we get to the xed point) give all the propositions obtained from the logical constant and all the truths respectively. The construction is well known mathematically and is similar to the one followed by Kripke in Kripke 1963] . Now consider our -structure FE. We can be sure from Theorem 1.15 that we have a list of F-functionals which includes: : : F 0 ?! F 0 _;^; !; ; _ = : F 0 F 0 ?! F 0 8; 9 : F 1 ?! F 0 But we still need to make sure that they satisfy the closure properties we want to impose on them. I shall here try to make the construction a little easier than that described by Aczel (in Aczel 1985] ). To construct a logical schema for each constant, i.e. to de ne the whole logical system, we follow Aczel's intended construction but will carry an example with us at all times. The logical system is de ned inductively. As the basis of the induction, we start with a pair 0 = ( 0p ; 0t ) such that 0t 0p . Intuitively, 0p is the set of propositions at stage 0 and 0t is the set of truths at stage 0. Example 1.17 Let 0 = ( 0p ; 0t ) = (f0; 1g; f1g). Note that both f0; 1g and f1g are in P ! .
Before proceeding to the induction step, we must de ne a couple of auxiliary predicates which ensure that the logical constants map their arguments into appropriate values. That is, for each logical constant F, there is one predicate F which tests whether a particular tuple of arguments has the correct status of propositionhood, and a second predicate F which states the conditions under which the tuple will be mapped into TRUTH by F. To see why we need this, recall the logical schema for negation that we presented under NEGATION above:
(1) If a is in PROP then :a is in PROP, and :a is in TRUTH i a is not in TRUTH. This is an instance of a general logical schema for those functionals F in a Frege structure which correspond to truth-functional connectives:
(2) If f is in F n 1 : : : F n k and C 0 (F; f), then F( f) is in PROP; and F( f) is in TRUTH i C(F; f), where C expresses F's truth conditions and C 0 expresses F's propositionhood.
Now it is F which tests that the arguments f are in PROP, while F does the work of C in (2). Example 1.18 : and : take arguments in ( i ) F 0 and
Thus, : ( 0 ; x) is true of the set 0p = f0; 1g, and : ( 0 ; x) is true of all elements in F 0 n 0t , i.e. everything except the element 1.
In order to carry out the induction step of the construction, we introduce a principle which determines how the propositions and truths at stage i + 1 are built from the propositions and truths at stage i. The principle has two parts as follows: Principle 1.19 i+1p is the collection of those F( f) where F is a logical constant and F ( i ; f). Principle 1.20 i+1t is the collection of those F( f) where F is a logical constant and both F ( i ; f) and F ( i ; f). In other words, given the pair ( ip ; it ), we construct ( i+1p ; i+1t ) in the following way:
rst, i+1p has to contain all and only those elements F( f) such that f belongs to the propositions at stage i, i.e. it is in ip according to F ( i ; f); and second, i+1t must contain all and only those elements F( f) such that f belongs to both the propositions and the truths at stage i, i.e. it is in ip and it according to F ( i ; f) and F ( i ; f). Notice that the principle guarantees that (i+1)t (i+1)p . Example 1.21 We wish to build 1 = ( 1p ; 1t ) from ( 0p ; 0t ) = (f0; 1g; f1g). By Principle 1.19, 1p is the set of objects :x such that : ( 0 ; x), i.e. it is the set f:0; :1g. By Principle 1.20, 1t is the set of objects :x such that : ( 0 ; x) and : ( 0 ; x), i.e. such that x belongs to 0p but does not belong to 0t . The only thing which satis es both these conditions is 0, so 1t = f:0g. Example 1.22 ^a nd ^t ake arguments in ( i ) (F 0 F 0 ) and ^( 0 ; (x; y)) is: x and y are in 0p ^( 0 ; (x; y)) is: x and y are in 0t Thus, we can supplement the 1p of the previous example with the set of objects^(x; y) such that (x; y) 0p 0p , i.e. the set f0^0; 0^1; 1^0; : : :g. Similarly, we add to 1t the set of objects^(x; y) such that (x; y) 0p 0t , i.e. the set f1^1g. Note that according to our example, the collection of objects in TRUTH at stage 1 is f1^1; :0g.
Note also that :0; 1^1; 1_0 are distinct objects, even though they are all in TRUTH and all have the same truth value in Frege's terms. If we wish, we could reconstruct Frege's notion of the True and the False by forming the relevant equivalence classes, but Frege structures give us an intensional ontology. This is justi ed on the grounds that objects with the same truth value, e.g. :0 and 1^1 are equivalent in truth value but distinct.
We see that the pair is being enlarged at each step starting from the rst step where we take 0p = f0; 1g and 0t = f1g, with the property that for each i we have: it ip .
Note that we are not imposing the condition that it (i+1)t or ip (i+1)p ; in fact our construction is monotonic in another sense which we shall see below. The aim is now to keep going up to a certain level where = ( p ; t ) is a logical system, because it is obvious that i at the levels we met so far are not logical systems. Take for example 0 in our example above based on FE. Then 0 is not a logical system, as can be seen by taking the logical schema for ::
If a is a proposition then :a is a proposition such that :a is true i :a is not true. 0 is not a logical system because 1 is in 0p (supposed to represent propositions) but :1 is not in 0p . Nor is 1 a logical system because :1 is in 1p but ::1 is not in 1p and so on. To solve this problem, let us consider the xed point (if it exists) of this construction. It may be that the xed point is a logical system and if so, we have succeeded. Before we prove that the xed point is a logical system, let us remind ourselves again of the construction. The construction is built through an operator Y which takes us from level i to level i+1 in such a way that Y ( i ) = i+1 , where i = ( ip ; it ), i+1 = ( i+1p ; i+1t ), it ip , i+1t i+1p .
Moreover i+1p and i+1t are obtained as follows:
For any F-functional F, i+1p is the collection of those F( f) where F is a logical constant and F ( i ; f) and i+1t is the collection of those objects F( f) where F is a logical constant and both F ( i ; f) and F ( i ; f). Now we prove that any such that = Y ( ) is a logical system. To show that, we have to prove that for each logical constant F, the logical schemata of F holds in . Let F be a logical constant whose logical schema is as follows:
If f is in F n 1 : : : F n k and F ( ; f), then F( f) is in p ; and F( f) is in t i F ( ; f).
Let us prove that this schema holds in where is a xed point, = ( p ; t ) and Y ( ) = ( p ; t ). Let f be in F n 1 : : : F n where F ( ; f). As F ( ; f) then F( f) is in 0 p by de nition, but 0 p = p (because = Y ( )), therefore F( f) is in p . Now let us prove that F( f) is in t i F ( ; f). (=)) If F( f) is in 0 t then F( f) is in 0 t . As F( f) is in 0 t then there exists an Ffunctional G and a sequence g in F n 1 : : : F n k such that F( g) = G( g) and G ( ; g) and G ( ; g) by de nition. But the logical constants are independent. Therefore F = G and as the family is primitive, f = g. Therefore we have from G ( ; g) that F ( ; g). (= Suppose F ( ; f), since also F ( ; f) then F( f) is in 0 t ; but 0 t = t , therefore F( f) is in t . 2 This implies that the logical schema of F holds in . Now we know that if there exists a xed point then this is a logical system. Let us nd a xed point.
We de ne an ordering on ( i ) i as follows: i i+1 if ip i+1p , and if x is in ip , then x is in it i x is in i+1t . With this ordering we can show that Y is monotonic. Note that the levels can be any ordinal even a trans nite one, for if we are at a nite ordinal i we de ne Y ( i ) := i+1 as above. If we are at a limit ordinal j, we de ne Y ( j ) = i for i < j. Applying the xed point theorem we get a xed point of Y . The reason for this is of course the monotonicity of the operator Y , as we know that the ordering relation is a partial ordering on all those pairs.
Scott Domains and nominalisation
The ordering relation on Scott domains makes predication trivial. For, a predicate P is true of all the objects in the model i it is true of the bottom element. Both semanticians and computer scientists however, share an interest in quanti cation and hence this problem of predication that faced Turner (in Turner' 1984] ) is a major issue for those interested in the semantics of either computer or natural languages and who base their work on Scott domains. The problem can be described as follows: Assume a language which has both objects and functions and assume that w s are built out of other ones using^; _; 8; 9; : : :. If the model is a Scott domain E 1 then there is no problem interpreting anything which is not a quanti ed sentence, as the interpretations of all such things are continuous functions and hence belong to the model. Let us choose the following interpretation for the quanti ers 8 and 9 8x ]] gwt = 8 > < > :
1 if for each d in D; ]] g d=x]wt = 1 0 if for some d in D; ]] g d=x]wt = 0 ? otherwise 9x ]] gwt = 8 > < > :
1 if for some d in D; ]] g d=x]wt = 1 0 if for each d in D; ]] g d=x]wt = 0 ? otherwise Then the following is a proof of the continuity of the quanti er clause for 8 . Assume by induction that we have ]] is continuous where does not involve quanti ers. To prove the continuity of 8x ]] (i.e. to prove it in ASG ?! S ?! EXT]] where ASG is the collection of assignment functions, S is the collection of states consisting of worlds and times and EXT is the extensional domain of values), we prove it continuous separately in each of its arguments, according to a theorem related to semantic domains.
Let us prove the continuity of 8x ]] for g in ASG. Take an !-sequence (g n ) n and prove that: 8x ]] gnwt = 8x ]] gnwt .
Assume 8x ]] gnwt = 0 () by de nition, (9d 2 D)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 0) () by induction, (9d 2 D)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 0) () by the structure of BOOL, (9d 2 D)(9n 2 w)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 0) () by logical laws, (9n 2 w)(9d 2 D)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 0) () by de nition, (9n 2 w)(8x ]] gn d=x]wt = 0) () by the structure of Bool, 8x ]] gnwt = 0 Assume 8x ]] gnwt = 1 () by de nition, (8d 2 D)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 1) () by induction, (8d 2 D)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 1) () by the structure of BOOL, (8d 2 D)(9n 2 w)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 1) () u d and monotonicity, (9n 2 w)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 1) () monotonicity, (9n 2 w)(8d 2 D)( ]] gn d=x]wt = 1) () by de nition, (9n 2 w)(8x ]] gn d=x]wt = 1) () by the structure of Bool, 8x ]] gnwt = 1 Therefore 8x ]] is continuous.
Note that this interpretation of quanti ers is abandoned later by Turner (in Turner' 1984] ) and he decided to adopt the following clauses instead: 8x ]] gwt = 8 > < > :
1 if for each d in E 1 n E n ; ]] g d=x]wt = 1 0 if for some d in E 1 n E n ; ]] g d=x]wt = 0 ? otherwise 9x ]] gwt = 8 > < > :
1 if for some d in E 1 n E n ; ]] g d=x]wt = 1 0 if for each d in E 1 n E n ; ]] g d=x]wt = 0 ? otherwise Of course working with Scott domains, you have always to check for continuity and this is the case with the new clauses. It can easily be proved that continuity does in fact hold and so we can still think of Scott domains as models.
We now describe the problem which made Turner move from the rst de nition of quanti ers to the second one. By adopting the rst de nition, we had: 8x ]] gwt = 1 i (8d 2 D)( ]] g d=x]wt = 1).
As ]] is continuous, therefore monotonic and as u d (where, as noted above, u is the unde ned) for each d in D then we get: (8d 2 D)( ]] g d=x]wt = 1) i ]] g u=x]wt = 1.
This clause has serious consequences. I shall illustrate this by taking in the formal language an element u 0 which names u (I.e. u 0 ]] gwt = u always). Now see what happens if we take to be: x = u 0 . Applying the above clause we get: x = u 0 ]] g u=x]wt = 1 i (8d 2 D)( x = u 0 ]] g d=x]wt = 1) which implies: u = u i (8d 2 D)(d = u).
That is absurd. We have to do something about this and the rst solution that one thinks of is to exclude the unde ned element from the quanti er clause. Therefore, instead of letting d range over all of D, we let it range over D (i.e. D n fug). But now Scott domains can no longer be models under this interpretation, for we no longer have 8x ]] is continuous. If we go back to the proof of continuity given above, we see that we had to use the unde ned element in order to prove continuity. Turner, realising this, exploits an important aspect of the structure of Scott domains. We explained earlier the existence of nite and in nite elements in E 1 and said that for each element d of E 1 , d is the limit of (e n ) n where e n belongs to E n and each E n is the domain of nite elements. The in nite (or ideal elements) are those which are in E 1 n E n . By restricting the quanti cation over these ideal elements only, we can prove again the closure of Scott models. However, by so restricting quanti cation, only in nite elements can be quanti ed over and nite elements are ignored.
Frege structures and nominalisation
Frege structures are not only a collection of collections of functions (as in the case of E 1 ), but they also have a certain logic which works on them, and whose availability solves also the problem of Section 1.1 of part I. Therefore, Frege structures solve both problems of section 1 of part I. In a Frege structure, quanti ers and other connectives are built inductively step by step so that at the xed point one gets all these logical constants. This availability of logic, makes Frege structures attractive candidates for the semantics of nominalisation. Their other advantage is the type theory that can be built inside them which accommodates self application. In fact, we mentioned in 2.2.1 of part I that the theory of types was not adequate to the semantics of nominalisation. The typing constraints according to Church's type theory are too restrictive for nominalisation and we need to have functions which can apply to themselves or to items of the same type. Abandoning Church's type theory does not imply getting rid of all the typed theories. We can still keep to typed languages but make the typing adequate to deal with nominalisation. This section will develop a type theory based on Frege structures such that for any two types ; the type < ; > is subsumed by the type . Some types will be circular or vacuous and they will be responsible for avoiding the paradoxes which threaten theories that combine type freeness and logic. Basically, our method is to allow type freeness yet to restrict the abstraction of various formulae which belong to various types. Types can be basic or functional space types. Amongst the functional space types we have those types which are circular or vacuous. Abstraction is restricted to those formulae which when abstracted over will belong to a non circular, non vacuous type.
Polymorphic types
The set of types is the smallest set T such that 1. p; t; e are in T are all distinct.
2. If ; are in T then < ; > is in T .
The types de ned in 1 are basic types, p is the type of propositions, t is the type of those true propositions (which are many according to the intensional framework) and e is the type of objects. Of course not every object should be a proposition and not every proposition should be a truth. 2 gives the complex types. We impose a subsumption relation on the types as follows:
1. e 2. t p 3. < ; > We also require that be a partial ordering and therefore impose the following additional conditions: 4.
if
and , then = 6. if and then 7. if , then < ; > < ; > 8. if p, then < ; > << ; >; > 1-6 are obvious. As an example of 7, take the propositional functions which are of type < e; p >; these functions are also of type < e; e >. 8 is there to capture those circular types.
In fact we have the following lemma: When , we say that subsumes, or is a more general type than, ; intuitively, it means that any expression which is of type is also of type . Note that e is the maximal element of the partial order, since it subsumes every type. We shall see that the subsumption relation plays a central role in polymorphism, and that there are models of such a typing system; that is, we will have functional domains X ) Y such that (X ) Y ) X.
Our next task is to extend the de nition of type so as to characterize the vacuous types, that is, the types which may be associated with empty domains. It is useful to rst introduce the auxiliary notion of a p(ropositional)-chain type. This is de ned inductively as follows:
De nition 3.2 (P-Chain Type) 1. If p and = e or = p or = t then < ; > is a p-chain type.
2. If is a p-chain type, and p then < ; > is a p-chain type. Example 3.3 < e; p >; < p; p >; < t; p >; << e; p >; p > (which is equal to < e; p >), << p; p >; p > (which is equal to < p; p >); << e; t >; < t; e >> : : : are p-chain types. Moreover, whenever is a p-chain type, then so are < ; t >; < ; p >; < ; < t; >> and < ; < p; >> (for any type ).
Note however that the following are not p-chain types: e; < e; e >; < e; < e; e >>; : : :
Vacuous types below will be associated with empty domains.
De nition 3.4 (Vacuous Types) is a vacuous type i : 1. =< ; > where and are p-chain types, and neither p nor p or 2. =< ; > where is a vacuous type, or 3.
, where is vacuous.
From 2 and 3 we can conclude that a function space < ; > is vacuous if its domain is vacuous, using < ; > .
Example 3.5 The following instances of =< ; > are vacuous: =<< e; p >; < e; p >>, by clause 1, since = =< e; p > and not < e; p > p. =<<< e; t >; < t; e >>; << e; t >; < t; e >>> There are p-chain types which are not vacuous; for example < e; p >. There are types that are vacuous but not p-chains. For example << e; p >; < e; p >>. There are types which are neither vacuous nor p-chains. For example, e; < e; e >; : : :.
The Syntax of Tpol
The basic expressions of Tpol are as follows:
1. For each type , there exists an in nite number of constants. Constants of type are referred to as c 2. For each type , there exists an in nite number of variables. Variables of type are referred to as u .
Expressions of type , are de ned recursively as follows:
1. u : . 2. c : . 3. If : ; u : and < ; > is a type which is not vacuous nor circular, then u: :< ; >. 4. If :< ; > and : 0 , where 0 , then app( ; ) : . 5. If : ; : 0 and 0 , then = 0 : p.
Suppose : p and : p then 6. : : p and : : t i not ( : t). 7. _ ] : p and _ ] : t i : t or : t. 8. ^ ] : p and ^ ] : t i : t and : t.
9.
] : p and ] : t i : t whenever : t.
10.
] : p and ] : t i : t i : t. 11. If : p and u is a variable of any type then 8u : p , and 8u : t i a=u] : t for every constant a : .
12. If : p and u is a variable of any type then 9u : p , and 9u : t i a=u] : t for some constant a : .
13. If 0 , then : 0 implies : . Notice that we have placed a syntactic restriction of -abstraction to ensure that abstracts never have vacuous or circular types.
Axioms
In our system, self-application is only possible for those expressions which have a complex type; indeed, this is what is required by clause 4 of the syntax above. The following version of -conversion is derivable: If E :< ; 0 > then x:Ex :< ; 0 >= E :< ; 0 > for x : free in E and < ; 0 > Proof x:Ex :< ; < ; 0 >> < ; 0 > E :< ; 0 > y : from ( ) ( x:Ex)y : 0 = Ex y=x] : 0 = Ey : 0 from (")
x:Ex :< ; 0 >= E :< ; 0 > 2 Axioms ( ); ( ); ( ) and ( ) are standard typed -calculus axioms. Axiom (") is the extensionality axiom. It says that if 1 and 2 give the same results for the same arguments, then they are equal. Axiom ( ) says that if f : A ?! B and if f=A 0 is the restriction of f to A 0 A, then f and f=A 0 give the same results for all elements in A 0 . Axiom ( ) says that if : 0 and if 0 then saying that equals to itself in is the same as saying that is equal to itself in 0 . Axiom ( ) is the re exivity of =.
Russell's and Curry's Paradoxes
Russell's paradox does not occur here because paradoxical expressions of the form x::app(x; x) are not well-formed. In fact, we have the following lemma: Lemma 3.6 If x is of type < ; p >, then x::app(x; x) of type << ; p >; p > is not well-formed.
Proof According to the de nition of meaningful expressions, it is enough to show that << ; p >; p > is a circular type. This is obvious from Lemma 3.1. 2
In fact, we have an even stronger lemma: Lemma 3.7 If x is of type < ; >, where p, then x::app(x; x) of type << ; >; p > is not well-formed.
Proof Exactly as that of Lemma 3.6. 2 With these lemmas, if x :< ; >, where p, then app(x; x) is of type p. Hence :app(x; x) is of type p. But x::app(x; x) is not well-formed in Tpol, due to clause 3 in the de nition of the expressions of a type, since its type, namely << e; p >; p >, is circular.
Curry's paradox comes from the presence of (DT ), (MP ) and where (DT ) and (MP ) are as follows:
(DT )
? f g` implies ?` ! , 6. app(a; a) : p`app(a; a) : t by 1 7. app(a; a) : p`? : t by (MP ) applied to 5 and 6
However, we cannot show that app(a; a) : p. In fact x:(app(x; x) ! ?) is not well formed due to Lemma 3.6 above as its type is << 0 ; p >; p >. This is because if x is of some type , since app(x; x) has to be of type p, we can infer that must be of the form < 0 ; p >. From this it follows that a is of type << 0 ; p >; p >, which is circular.
Models of Tpol
For the present paper we shall concentrate on F 0 , PROP and SET (where PROP\SET = ;) and then we shall construct domains inside F 0 which represent the types described in our theory Tpol.
Given domains X; Y already in the Frege structure, we build new domains as follows:
(DOM) X ) Y = fx 2 X : 8x 0 2 X app(x; x 0 ) 2 Y ]g. As a special case of (DOM), the domain (F 0 ) PROP) = SET inside F 0 contains the nominals of propositional functions. Now let us see if the structure of types can be captured by the domains. Lemma 3.8 If X; Y are domains, then (X ) Y ) X.
Proof Obvious. 2 Lemma 3.9 If X and Y are domains built as above, then Y Y 0 implies (X ) Y ) (X ) Y 0 ).
Proof If x 2 X ) Y , then 8x 0 2 X; app(x; x 0 ) 2 Y , by (DOM). Since Y Y 0 , it follows that 8x 0 2 X; app(x; x 0 ) 2 Y 0 and so x 2 X ) Y 0 . 2 Lemma 3.10 If X and Y are domains built as above, then X X 0 implies (X \ (X 0 ) Y )) (X ) Y ).
Proof If x 2 X \ (X 0 ) Y ) then x 2 X, and x 2 (X 0 ) Y ); by (DOM), 8x 0 2 X 0 ; app(x; x 0 ) 2 Y . Hence, we have both that x 2 X and, since X X', 8x 0 2 X; app(x; x 0 ) 2 Y . Therefore x 2 X ) Y . 2 We now inductively de ne a relation between arbitrary domains X and the domain SET. This relation is related to the notion of a p-chain type which we de ned earlier. The relation X SET holds i 1. X = SET, or 2. X = (X 0 ) Y 0 ) where X 0 SET and Y 0 PROP. We say that a domain X is inductively predicable i X SET. Lemma 3.11 If X SET then X SET. Proof The proof is by an easy induction. If X = SET then the property holds. Assume by induction that the property holds up to X 0 , and show that the property holds for X = (X 0 ) Y ) where X 0 SET. By Lemma 3.9, (X 0 ) Y ) X 0 , and since X 0 SET by inductive hypothesis, we have by transitivity that X SET. 2
The following lemma informs us that if X; Y are inductively predicable then X ) Y is empty. When we give the denotation of our various types, we will nd that the domains associated with vacuous types are always empty. Lemma 3.12 SET ) X is empty whenever X SET . Proof The proof is by induction on X:
1. If X = SET then SET ) SET is empty, for the following reason. Suppose x is in SET ) SET. Then for every x 0 2 SET, app(x; x 0 ) 2 SET. But app(x; x 0 ) is also in PROP, by the de nition of x being a SET. Hence, PROP \ SET is not empty.
Contradiction.
2. Assume SET ) X is empty for X SET, and show that the domain Y = SET ) (X ) Y ) is empty. Suppose Y is not empty, then if x is in SET ) (X ) Y ), then for any x 0 in SET, app(x; x 0 ) is in X ) Y . Hence app(x; x 0 ) 2 X for any x 0 2 SET. Hence x is in SET ) X which is empty. Contradiction. 2 Theorem 3.13 X ) Y is empty for X; Y SET. Proof The proof is by induction on X SET. If X = SET then the theorem holds according to Lemma 3.12 . Assume the property holds for X 0 SET, that is, the domain X 0 ) Y is empty for any Y SET; we must show that (X 0 ) Y 0 ) ) Y is empty for Y 0 PROP. If Z is not empty, i.e. there is some a in (X 0 ) Y 0 ) ) Y , then a is also in X 0 ) Y 0 and for all x in X 0 ) Y 0 , app(a; x) is in Y 0 PROP. But for all x in X 0 ) Y 0 , app(a; x) is in Y 0 SET. Hence app(a; x) is in PROP \ SET which is empty, absurd. 2 Example 3.14 The following domains are empty: SET ) SET SET ) (SET ) PROP) (SET ) PROP) ) SET and every domain built recursively out of the above three using ).
Semantics of Types
A model M for Tpol is a quadriple < F; ); C; D >, where 1. F is a Frege structure in which PROP \ SET = ;, 2. ) is as de ned above by (DOM), 3. The function D which maps types into domains of M is de ned as follows: D e = F 0 , D p = PROP, D t = TRUTH, D < ; > = D ) D , where < ; > is non-vacuous.
4. C is an interpretation function which takes any constant of type to an object in D .
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
In this part, we showed that Frege structures provide a solution to both problems; we provided a type theory where any function belongs to its domain and hence the theory is a suitable framework for nominalisation. Now we assess further the advantages one obtains with Frege structures. We start with type freeness and the fact that SET is isomorphic to Propositional functions F 0 ?! PROP and that SET F 0 . Also, we have the two following functionals: k k 1 : SET ?! PF 1 : PF 1 ?! SET. If we assume that the interpretation of verbs takes place in F i for i 1 and thus that walk]] is in F 1 , then we get: to walk]]g = : walk]] g . Now it is straightforward to interpret things like to walk hurts, for: to walk hurts]] g = hurt]] g ( to walk]]g) = hurt]] g ( : walk]] g ).
The advantage of what we just o ered lies in the elegance of classifying the denotation of our items. With Montague's and Turner's approaches, one has always to check whether the denotation of an item is in the right domain. With our approach, we do not need to check whether to walk]] g is in F 0 or not using some confusing domain equations. All we had to say was that walk]] g is in F 1 ; therefore walk]] g is in F 0 . This actually seems to be an encouraging advantage about Frege structures: nominalisation and self reference are a natural process inside the Frege structure. It also seems that we have real application, unlike in Scott domains where application is only through the isomorphic embedding. This is because instead of interpreting things as above into F i , for i 0, we can restrict everything to F 0 obtaining fun is fun]] g = pred( fun]] g ; fun]] g ).
Therefore it seems that by using Frege structures we get the following advantages over Scott domains, 1. Real self application 2. Less cumbersome checking for the right typing than that involved with Scott domains. It is mainly checking the propositionhood of various items to obtain the type of the resulting item. 3. No redundant semantic types 4. Nominalisation seems to ow naturally 5. Quanti cation For the sake of completeness, we mention a new approach to a theory of properties proposed by Turner (in Turner 1987] ) which abandons completely the use of Scott domains. Turner's new theory is one which starts from Frege's comprehension principle and restricts it in such a way that the paradox is no longer derivable. Turner starts with a rst order theory which has a pairing system and adds to this theory a new operator p (to serve as the predication operator) together with the lambda operator. Then in this case, if one assumes full classical logic and Frege's comprehension principle, one will certainly derive the paradox;
for, take a = x::p(x; x), then p(a; a) $ :p(x; x) a=x] $ :p(a; a). Contradiction.
Of course, the problem does not come from contraction, i.e. p( x:A; t) ! A(t; x) is always true. But the converse implication (i.e. expansion) is problematic. This is due to negation, i.e. if A is atomic then we can accept A(t; x) ! p( x:A; t). But we cannot accept it when A is like Russell's property, an atomic term proceeded by a negation sign. This is exactly what guides Turner in setting his theory. For the theory now will have the following axioms replacing Frege's comprehension principle:
A(t; x) ! p( x:A; t) when A is atomic.
(R) p( x:A; t) ! A(t; x). (I) p( x:p( y:A; t); u) ! p( y:p( x:A; u); t) Now the abandonment of Frege's full comprehension axiom will impose the use of two logics, one inside the predication operator in addition to the usual one for w s. This is due to the fact that breaking the equivalence between p( x:A; t) and A(t; x) will disconnect the reasoning about w s and properties. To build models for T above, one uses the xed point operator to turn an ordinary model of the rst order theory into a model which will validate in it as many instances of the comprehension axiom as possible. It will of course validate only the safe instances whereas the paradoxical ones will oscillate in truth-values. The inductive step to build the model should be obvious. As an example, one can start with the rst order model, and an operator PI which is empty at the beginning. Then at the next step, extend PI to also contain the pairs < x:A]]; t]] gM > such that A]] g t]]g=x] = 1 and so on until one gets a limit ordinal where PI then is to have in it all the pairs < e; d > such that for some ordinal smaller than this , < e; d > belongs to all the intermediate PI's. Now we no longer have a full comprehension principle and we cannot do with properties what we can do with formulae. But there are still a great deal of things that one can identify between properties and w s; for example, from P( x:A; t) and P( x:B; t) one can derive p( x:A^B; t). Turner showed however that theories of Frege structures are weaker than his theory of properties which is a fact that may stand to our advantage for the following reasons. Firstly, Turner can prove at least as much in his theory as one can in a theory based on Frege structures. Secondly, Turner is paying a price for the strength of his theory | mainly his use of two logics (internal and external) rather than one only. On balance it seems better to use a theory based on Frege structures for properties. Doing so gains the advantages of Turner without the complications.
From the point of view of typing, whereas I use a type free theory, Cocchiarella uses a second order one. There are however some similarities and di erences in these two ways of typing that I would like to illustrate. According to axiom (9) under 1.1.2 of Part I, we have ME n ME 0 for all n > 1, where ME n are the meaningful expressions of any type n. For us, we have that ME n ME 0 for any 1 n but the pictures of both approaches are quite di erent. According to our approach these types are related to each other in a chain like way.
That is ME n MEn ? 1 : : : ME 0 . For Cocchiarella we have that each ME n ME 0 for n > 1, yet no relation exists between ME n and ME m for n 6 = m. Also for Cocchiarella, propositions are not included in objects, even though they can be embedded in ME 0 by axiom (8) under the same paragraph. Hence Cocchiarella's whole structure can be understood as a collection of objects, which has a denumerably in nite number of subcollections called functions but where propositions are outside the domain of objects and can be mapped into it. This structure for Cocchiarella is not a structure of types in the sense that we have in the typing structure in . In fact everything that Cocchiarella has so far we have; as can be seen in ], a Frege structure is F 0 ; : : : ; F n , where F 0 , is the collection of objects, F k is the collection of k-ary functions and each of these F k , can be embedded in F 0 , by k . What we have in addition is a typing system constructed inside F 0 , which cannot be found in Cocchiarella's theory. Also, our system is rst order in that the quanti cation over objects and functions is the same, whereas Cocchiarella's system is second order.
